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Abstract—We consider a queueing system with multiple het-
erogeneous servers serving a multiclass population. The classes
are distinguished by time costs. All customers have i.i.d. service
requirements. Arriving customers do not see the instantaneous
queue occupancy. Arrivals are randomly routed to one of the
servers and the routing probabilities are determined centrally
to optimize the expected waiting cost. This is, in general, a
difficult optimization problem and we obtain the structure of the
routing matrix. Next we consider a system in which each queue
charges an admission price. The arrivals are routed randomly
to minimize an individual objective function that includes the
expected waiting cost and the admission price. Once again, we
obtain the structure of the equilibrium routing matrix for this
case. Finally, we determine the admission prices to make the
equilibrium routing probability matrix equal to a given optimal
routing probability matrix.
I. INTRODUCTION
We study service systems involving customers of multiple
types or classes, any of whom can be served by any one
of several heterogeneous servers. Customers arrive into the
system according to a random process, reside in a queue while
waiting for service or being served, and then depart. Customer
classes differ in their aversion to some congestion based metric
like waiting time, delay, the number in the queue, etc. We seek
to determine how customers may be assigned to servers in such
a way as to optimize some social welfare function, and also
how pricing may be used to incentivize selfish customers to
achieve the same social optimum.
Examples of such systems include web server farms, cloud
and grid computing clusters, communication networks and
cognitive radio systems. In these examples, customers may
differ in the quality of service they require, and in their
willingness to pay for it. The quality of service of a customer
may depend on the share of bandwidth or other resources
it receives, or the service latency or the sojourn time in
the system. Our modeling framework is quite general in
this regard. Other examples encompassed by our framework
include transport networks, which may comprise of parallel
tolled and toll-free highways or multiple modes of transport,
and also healthcare systems.
We capture customer requirements or preferences in the
form of a congestion cost function that could be based on the
occupancy, delay or waiting time in the system. We distinguish
between customer classes by applying suitable multipliers to
the congestion cost. Defining a social objective of minimizing
the sum of customer costs, we study properties of socially op-
timal allocations. Next, we consider selfish customers in which
each infinitesimal customer routes itself so as to optimize its
individual expected utility. In this setting, we allow each server
to charge a fixed, class-independent admission price to each
customer using it. The cost for each customer is the sum of the
waiting time cost and the admission price. This is a nonatomic
routing game and we study the properties of the equilibrium
distribution of the traffic. The equilibrium distribution for
nonatomic games is also known as Wardrop equilibrium [1].
Finally, we ask if there exist admission prices for which
the corresponding Wardrop equilibrium coincides with the
socially optimal routing; and answer it in the affirmative by
determining the prices. The analysis is presented for the case
when the number of classes is finite and also for the case when
the number of classes is uncountable.
The objective of this paper is threefold—(1) analyze the
structure of optimal allocation of a heterogeneous customer
population to servers in multiserver, multiqueue system,
(2) analyze the equilibrium allocation of customers when
the servers charge an admission price, and (3) determine
admission prices that can possibly achieve optimal allocation
through selfish routing. The model is rather general with
minimal assumptions. The key generalization is that the cost
function (representing delay, percentile or any other conges-
tion metric) at each server is general and only needs to be
increasing in the load on the server. Toward achieving this
threefold objective, we make the following key contributions.
• We show that the optimization problem that determines
the socially optimal routing policy is in general non con-
vex and hard. However, we characterize certain structural
properties possessed by any optimal policy. Two interest-
ing properties of the optimal routing policy emerge in this
analysis. (1) Two customer classes can have at most one
common server. (2) Two servers that serve more than one
traffic class between them will have distinct congestion
delays.
• For the nonatomic routing game with selfish customers,
and arbitrary admission prices at the servers, the equilib-
rium distribution of traffic has a structure that is similar
to the socially optimal routing.
• Finally, we show that we can indeed set prices so that the
resulting equilibrium coincides with the social optimum.
One set of such prices admit an interpretation as Pigou-
vian taxes associated with congestion externalities at the
servers.
2A. Previous Work
There is a substantial literature on the allocation of multi-
class customers to parallel queues in both centralized and
decentralized settings, including a variety of pricing schemes
and game-theoretic formulations. Below, we describe some
of the work more closely related to the approach taken in
this paper and delineate these from the results presented in
this paper. We use Kendall’s notation for queueing models
throughout.
Borst [2] studied the probabilistic allocation of multiclass
traffic to parallel M/G/1 queues so as to minimize a specific
social cost function, namely the total mean waiting cost per
unit of time. The arriving customers are from a multiclass
population and a class j is characterized by the two tuple(
βj
sj
,
s
(2)
j
sj
)
where βj is the waiting cost per unit time while sj
and s(2)j denote the first and the second moment of the service
requirement. It is shown that in an optimal allocation, customer
types must be clustered according to their
(
βj
sj
,
s
(2)
j
sj
)
values
and there can be at most one customer class between any
two different servers. It is also shown that while each server
handles a traffic mix which is as homogeneous as possible,
different servers have traffic mixes of a different composition.
A special case is then analyzed where the service rates at
the servers are identical and when the customer classes form
an ordered set. For the case when the customer classes are
all identical, it is shown that load balancing will lead to an
optimal allocation minimizing the total waiting cost. However
when the customer classes are not identical, it is shown that
an optimal allocation will never have the load at all the
servers to be equal or balanced. Sethuraman and Squillante
[3] considered a variant of this problem where in addition to
optimal routing, one is required to also choose an order in
which the multiclass customers are served in the queues. It
was shown that an optimal sequencing policy for the servers
is to prioritize customers of higher classes. While the routing
problem could not be solved explicitly, it was shown that it had
an interior solution. The structure we obtain for our optimal
routing is essentially the same as in Borst [2], but our results
apply to a very general class of queueing models and cost
functions. Further, we also consider a game-theoretic setting of
selfish optimization and a pricing mechanism that will achieve
social optimality with selfish optimization. While Sethuraman
and Squillante [3] also consider the optimal sequencing in a
queue, we assume that the servers cannot discriminate between
classes in our model, which may be more realistic depending
on the application.
The equilibrium allocation of customers in a multiqueue
system is studied by Bell and Stidham [4] and Haviv and
Roughgarden [5]. Bell and Stidham [4] studied a single non
balking traffic class served by a set of parallel M/G/1 queues.
The servers differ in their holding cost per unit time denoted by
hi and the service rate that is denoted by µi for server i. With
the assumption that h1/µ1 ≤ h2/µ2 . . . ≤ hM/µM , the social
cost minimization problem is solved using the generalized
Lagrangian technique while the Wardrop conditions are used
to identify the structure of the individually optimal routing. To
compare the two allocations, it is shown that if a server is not
used in an optimal allocation, then it will also not be utilized
in individually optimal routing. Further, it is shown that
an individually optimal routing overloads the lower indexed
servers, as compared to the socially optimal one. Restricting
their attention on this problem to parallel M/M/1 queues,
Haviv and Roughgarden [5] obtain an upper bound on the
price of anarchy (PoA), defined as the ratio of the total cost
at the Wardrop equilibrium to that at the social optimum. In
addition to allowing a general cost function we also consider
a multiclass population of customers.
There are several works that use admission prices to reduce
congestion [6]–[10]. In Naor [6] and Edelson and Hilderbrand
[7], customers, who belong to a single class, have to choose be-
tween paying an admission price to enter the queue, incurring a
delay cost and receiving a fixed reward for service, or balking
(leaving without being served). Admission prices are set by
an operator who seeks to maximize revenue. If customers can
observe the queue length on arrival and base their balking
decision on it, then the revenue maximizing admission price
exceeds the one that maximizes social welfare ( [6] ). However,
if customers cannot observe the queue and have to base their
decision on only the known arrival and service rates, then these
two admission prices coincide ( [7], [8] ). In the latter setting,
Littlechild [8] obtains the admission fee as a Pigouvian tax
and shows that this will induce a socially optimal arrival rate.
While Edelson and Hilderbrand [7] and Littlechild [8] consider
a single class of customers and a single M/M/1 queue with the
delay as the cost, we consider multiclass customers, multiple
servers and also a general cost function. More importantly, we
do not allow balking and all customers have to join one of the
queues. Bradford [9] extends some of the work ( [6]–[8] ) to
multiclass customers each with its own delay cost and reward
for service and obtains the Pigouvian admission charge for
each class that achieves the socially optimal allocation. The
admission charge is independent of the queue from which the
customer receives service. This, and the fact that the system
needs to elicit information of the customer class, we believe,
makes their model inapplicable in many situations. More
importantly, like in the preceding references, the objective is to
reduce congestion in the system by allowing customers to balk.
Masuda and Whang [10] considers a similar model except that
customers of different classes have the same delay cost. The
model of Altman and Kameda in [11] has some similarities
with that considered in this paper. However, the focus in [11]
is on the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium while we focus
on the structure of the equilibrium routing. All of the above
consider nonatomic routing games in which each infinitesimal
customer is making a selfish decision. Typically, such routing
games are analyzed as congestion games (also known as exact
potential games); however our model does not admit such
a potential function, because different players have different
delay tolerances, and hence incur different costs in the same
queue.
There is also significant literature on atomic routing games,
e.g., [12]–[15]. In this case, one can view each class as having
a dispatcher that seeks to allocate customers of that class to
servers in such a way that the expected cost for the class is
3minimized. Orda, Rom, and Shimkin [12] consider the atomic
routing game when a number of flows selfishly split their
traffic among multiple routes, and obtain equilibrium flows
on the different links. Korilis, Lazar, and Orda [13] consider
the allocation of bandwidths on the links such that equilibrium
routing of [12] is socially optimal. Altman, Ayesta, and Prabhu
[14] and Ayesta, Brun, and Prabhu [15] also study atomic
routing games in non cooperative load balancing problems.
For M/G/1 processor sharing queues, they obtain bounds on
the price of anarchy. Our interest in this paper is on nonatomic
games, and we look at the use of admission prices rather than
capacity allocation as the mechanism to guide the system to
a social optimum.
An alternative use of admission prices is in purchasing
priorities [16]–[19]. However, this is not of interest to us in
this paper. See Hassin and Haviv [20] for a comprehensive
survey of these and other similar models. More recently, there
have been papers proposing the use of differentiated prices
in the Internet and studying the resultant user strategies and
equilibria [21]–[24].
II. MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a system with M classes of customers and
N queues. Class m customers arrive according to a Pois-
son process of rate λm, independent of other classes. The
allocation of arriving customers to queues has to be made
with no knowledge of current or past queue occupancies, or
past arrival times or routing decisions. (It goes without saying
that the future is also unknown.) Such an assumption may be
less realistic for centralized allocation than when customers
have to make individual decisions. Nevertheless, imposing this
assumption uniformly permits clearer comparison of the two
settings. Under this assumption, it is natural to restrict attention
to Markovian routing policies, i.e., to policies which route
customers of class i to queue j with some fixed probability
pij . This is also the class of policies considered in [2], [3].
Under Markovian routing, the aggregate arrival process into
queue j is a Poisson process of rate γj where
γj =
M∑
i=1
λipij . (1)
We assume that customers of all classes have the same job
size distributions, and that, once they join a queue, they are
treated identically within it. Associated with queue j is a cost
function Dj(·) that specifies a cost associated with a given
aggregate arrival rate. For example, the cost could be the mean
sojourn time, or some higher moment of it, or the probability
of the sojourn time exceeding a specified threshold. Our only
assumption is that each function Dj be monotone increasing,
and continuously differentiable in the interior of its domain
(the set of arrival rates for which Dj is finite), with strictly
positive derivative.
Finally, with each class i, we associate a positive parameter
βi that quantifies its sensitivity to delay or congestion by
multiplying the cost incurred by a class i customer by βi.
The only distinction between classes is in applying different
multipliers βi to their costs in any queue. Without loss of
generality, we take β1 > β2 > . . . > βM ; if βi = βj , we can
collapse them into a single class, as customers are otherwise
assumed to be identical.
The assumptions above are rather mild. We do not restrict
the number of servers at a queue or the service discipline.
Indeed, different queues may have different numbers of servers
and employ different service disciplines. They can also employ
different cost functions, for example the mean sojourn time
at one queue and the second moment at another. The only
requirement is that each queue treat all customers alike,
irrespective of their class. In addition to traditional queueing
models, our set-up also encompasses transport models for
example, where the mean journey time on a road may be some
function of the traffic intensity on it. The main motivation
for the assumption of Poisson arrivals is that it makes the
Dj functions of a single real variable. It is not obvious
how the monotonicity and differentiability assumptions would
generalize if Dj were to be a function of the law of a stochastic
process.
We are now ready to state the social welfare maximization
problem. The objective is
inf
P
U(P ) =
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
βiλipijDj(γj), (2)
where the infimum is taken over all M × N right stochastic
matrices P = [[pij ]] (defined as matrices with non-negative
entries whose row sums are unity). The γj depend on P
through (1), though this dependence has not been made explicit
in the notation. Thus, the social cost is defined as the sum of
the expected costs incurred by customers of different classes
at different queues, weighted by the corresponding flow rates.
Next, we consider the formulation of a game between
customers. Here, we allow the queues to charge admission
prices, denoted by cj at queue j. Without loss of generality,
we take c1 > c2 > . . . > cN ; if ci = cj , then we can collapse
these two queues into a single queue whose delay function
is the inf-convolution of the delay functions of its constituent
queues, i.e.,
D(γ) = inf{Di(γ1) +Dj(γ2) : γ1, γ2 ≥ 0, γ1 + γ2 = γ}.
The goal of a class i customer entering the system is to
choose a queue j so as to minimize cj + βiDj(γj) where
γj is determined through the strategies of all customers. We
assume that the rates λ1, . . . , λM , the cost functions Dj(·)
and the parameters βi, i = 1, . . . ,M and cj , j = 1, . . . , N
are all common knowledge. Under the additional assumptions,
noted earlier, that a customer does not have access to current
or past queue occupancies, or the history of arrival times or
decisions, its strategy is necessarily restricted to choosing a
server according to a fixed probability distribution, albeit one
that may depend on its class. Thus, again, the joint strategies
may be represented by a right stochastic routing matrix, P.
Recall that the condition for such a routing matrix P to be a
Wardrop equilibrium [1] is as follows.
∀ i, j, k pij > 0 ⇒ cj + βiDj(γj) ≤ ck + βiDk(γk).
(3)
4The condition of (3) says that if a customer of class i has a
positive probability of using a queue, then its expected cost
in that queue must be no higher than its expected cost in any
other queue. Further, if there is a positive probability of such
a customer of using queues j and k, then the above inequality
is actually an equality. Wardrop equilibrium is also the Nash
equilibrium for nonatomic routing games and is extensively
used. See [25](Chapter 18) for an overview of nonatomic
selfish routing games.
The model described in the preceding discussion considers
the case when the customers belong to one of the M classes
and all customers of class i have the same parameter βi.
An alternative model to characterize the delay sensitivity of
the arriving customers is by assuming that such sensitivities
β are from a continuum of values. Such a model for the
heterogeneous user population is more realistic where it is
hard to classify customers into a fixed number of classes, e.g.,
those involving human customers. In this paper, in addition
to discrete classes we also consider the case of a continuum
of customer classes which is modeled as follows. Customer
arrivals constitute a marked Poisson process of intensity λ×F
on R × R+, where F is a cumulative distribution function
supported on the positive reals. The marks, β, denote the
delay sensitivities of the customers and are i.i.d. random
variables, independent of the arrival time of the customer,
and independent of the past (arrival times and marks) of
the process. We assume that the marks are drawn from a
distribution F which is absolutely continuous with respect to
Lebesgue measure, and having a density f . We further assume
that for every β in the interior of its support, f(β) is bounded
away from zero and from ∞.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe
the structure of a matrix P ∗ solving the welfare optimization
problem (2) in Section III. In Section IV, we show that a
solution PW of (3) also has a similar structure, for any
admission prices. We then show how to choose the admission
prices so as to make PW coincide with P ∗, and illustrate
our general results with numerical examples in Section V.
We conclude in Section VI with a discussion of some open
problems.
III. SOCIAL WELFARE OPTIMIZATION
Consider the optimization problem (2). As the maps P 7→ γj
and Dj are continuous, the problem is one of minimizing a
continuous function over the compact set of right stochastic
matrices. Hence, there is a matrix P ∗ achieving the infimum.
We will now characterize some properties of the matrix P ∗
below.
Theorem 1:
• Let P ∗ achieve the minimum in (2) and let γ∗j denote
the arrival rate to Server j corresponding to P ∗ as given
by (1). Consider two customer classes i1 < i2, so that
βi1 > βi2 . Suppose j1 and j2 are distinct queues such that
i1 uses j1 and i2 uses j2, i.e., p∗i1j1 > 0 and p
∗
i2j2
> 0.
Then Dj1(γ∗j1 ) < Dj2(γ
∗
j2
).
• A P ∗ with both p∗i1j1 , p
∗
i1j2
> 0 and p∗i2j2 , p
∗
i2j1
> 0
simultaneously is not possible. In words, it is not possible
to have two distinct queues, both of which are used by
each of two distinct customer classes.
Proof: The proof of the first part is by contradiction. To
lighten the notation, we shall write β1, for βi1 , λ1 for λi1 ,
p11 for pi1j1 , pm1 for pm,j1 , D∗1 for D1(γ∗j1) and so on.
First, suppose that D∗1 > D∗2 . From the assumption of the
theorem, p∗11, p∗22 > 0 and hence, for a sufficiently small ǫ > 0,
we can find a different routing matrix P such that
λ1p11 = λ1p
∗
11 − ǫ, λ1p12 = λ1p
∗
12 + ǫ,
λ2p22 = λ2p
∗
22 − ǫ, λ2p21 = λ2p
∗
21 + ǫ,
and all other elements of P are the same as the corresponding
elements of P ∗. In words, we have shifted a quantity ǫ of
the flow of class 1 customers from queue 1 to queue 2, and
an equal quantity of class 2 customers from 2 to 1, leaving
all others unchanged to create P from P ∗. This swap has
ensured that the flow rate γj under P is exactly the same
as γ∗j for j = 1 to N. Additionally, in the routing matrix P,
the quantities p11, p12, p21 and p22 are positive. (We had not
assumed anything about p∗12 and p∗21 in the statement of the
theorem.) Consequently, we can compute the change in social
cost as
U(P )− U(P ∗) = ǫ(β1 − β2)(D
∗
2 −D
∗
1).
Now, β1 > β2, while we assumed that D∗1 > D∗2 . But this
implies that U(P ) < U(P ∗), contradicting the minimality
of P ∗. This establishes that D∗1 ≤ D∗2 . Next, again by
contradiction, we show that the inequality is strict.
Suppose next that D∗1 = D∗2 . Consider the routing matrix
P described above, and define the matrices Pα = αP + (1−
α)P ∗. Then Pα is a right stochastic matrix for all α ∈ [0, 1]
and it assigns non-zero amounts of class 1 and class 2 traffic
to each of the queues 1 and 2. By the same argument as above,
the total flow rate γαj , induced by Pα is the same as γ∗j for
j = 1 to N. Moreover, U(Pα) = U(P ∗) as Pα only differs
from P ∗ in changing the composition of traffic at two queues
1 and 2 of equal cost, while keeping the total flows unchanged.
Hence, Pα also achieves the minimum in (2). We now apply
the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for optimality at
Pα for α ∈ (0, 1] where p11, p12, p21 and p22 are all strictly
between 0 and 1. (The regularity conditions needed for the
KKT necessary conditions to be applicable hold because the
constraints on P ∗ are affine.) The KKT conditions imply that
∂U(Pα)
∂p11
=
∂U(Pα)
∂p12
,
∂U(Pα)
∂p21
=
∂U(Pα)
∂p22
.
Using the definitions of U and γj , we can rewrite the first
equality above as
β1λ1D
α
1 + β1λ
2
1p
α
11(D
α
1 )
′ + λ1
∑
m 6=1
βmλmp
α
m1(D
α
1 )
′
= β1λ1D
α
2 + β1λ
2
1p
α
12(D
α
2 )
′ + λ1
∑
m 6=1
βmλmp
α
m2(D
α
2 )
′,
where we write (Dα1 )′ and (Dα2 )′ to denote the derivatives
of D1 and D2 with respect to γ1 and γ2 evaluated at
γα1 and γα2 respectively. But D∗1 = D∗2 by assumption,
and γαj coincides with γ∗j for all α in [0, 1] by construc-
5tion. Further as Pα only differs from P ∗ in changing the
composition of traffic from Classes 1 and 2 at two queues
1 and j, only the terms pα11, pα12, pα21 and pα22 are a func-
tion of α. The terms pαm1 and pαm2 do not depend on α
for m 6= 1. The terms (Dα1 )′ and (Dα2 )′ are also in-
dependent of α and hence λ1
∑
m 6=1 βmλmp
α
m1(D
α
1 )
′ and
λ1
∑
m 6=1 βmλmp
α
m2(D
α
2 )
′ are constant for any α ∈ (0, 1).
Denoting these by η1 and η2 respectively, and using the fact
that γαj = γ∗j implies (Dαj )′ = (D∗j )′ we obtain that
β1λ
2
1p
α
11(D
∗
1)
′ = β1λ
2
1p
α
12(D
∗
2)
′ + η2 − η1,
for all α ∈ (0, 1). But this is impossible because the D′ are
non-zero by assumption, one of pα11 and pα12 is an increasing
function of α while the other is a decreasing function. Hence,
it is also not possible for D∗1 and D∗2 to be equal.
The second part will also be proved by contradiction.
Suppose that P ∗ satisfies p∗11, p∗12 > 0 and p∗22, p∗21 > 0
simultaneously. Since p∗11 > 0 and p∗22 > 0, from the first
part of the theorem we have D1(γ∗1 ) < D2(γ∗2 ). However
from the assumption that p∗21 > 0 and p∗12 > 0, the first
part of the theorem also implies D1(γ∗1 ) > D2(γ∗2 ). However,
D1(γ
∗
1 ) < D2(γ
∗
2 ) and D1(γ∗1 ) > D2(γ∗2 ) cannot be simulta-
neously possible and leads to a contradiction. This means that
a P ∗ with both p∗11, p∗12 > 0 and p∗22, p∗21 > 0 is not possible.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
We now use Theorem 1 to establish a structural property
of any optimal allocation of customers to queues, i.e., of any
solution of (2).
Corollary 1: Suppose P ∗ solves the optimization problem
(2), and let γ∗j denote the resulting flow rate, as given by
(1). Consider a re-ordering of the queues such that D1(γ∗1 ) ≤
D2(γ
∗
2 ) ≤ . . . ≤ DN(γ
∗
N ). Then, there exist numbers
n1, . . . , nM , with 1 ≤ n1 ≤ n2 ≤ . . . nM ≤ N, such that
pij
{
> 0, if j ∈ {ni−1 + 1, . . . ni − 1},
= 0, if j /∈ {ni−1, . . . ni}.
Moreover, for each ni, either pini or p(i+1)ni or both are
strictly positive. 1
In words, the corollary says that each customer class uses
a nearly dedicated set of queues in the above ordering, with a
possible overlap only at the boundaries of the sets. Note that
it is possible for more than two classes of customers to use
the same queue. For example, if n1 = n2 = n3 = n4, then
customer classes 2 and 3 certainly use this queue (as they have
nowhere else to go), while customer classes 1 and 4 may or
may not do so. It is possible to have nM < N, in which case
there are some queues that aren’t used by any customer class.
This would be the case if, even at zero load, the delay in these
queues is larger than in the alternatives.
Proof: Let P ∗ solve the welfare optimization problem
(2). Define Qi = {j : p∗ij > 0} to be the set of queues used
by class i under P ∗, and order these queues in non-decreasing
order of delays. Clearly, each Qi is non-empty. Define
Dmaxi = max
j∈Qi
Dj(γ
∗
j ), D
min
i = min
j∈Qi
Dj(γ
∗
j ).
1We use the convention that the set {a, a+1, . . . , b} is assumed empty if
a > b.
By Theorem 1, Dmaxi ≤ Dmini+1 , with equality only if the same
queue j attains the maximum in the first case and the minimum
in the second. Moreover, in this case, every queue k 6= j in Qi
has Dk(γ∗k) strictly smaller than Dj(γ∗j ), while every queue
k 6= j in Qi+1 has Dk(γ∗k) strictly larger than Dj(γ∗j ).
The claim of the corollary is now obvious.
We now turn to the question of the computational com-
plexity of finding the optimal allocation P ∗. Despite the nice
structure of the optimal allocation provided by Corollary 1,
it is far from obvious whether there is a polynomial time
algorithm to find the optimal allocation, or even the ordering
of queues at the optimal allocation. If the welfare optimization
problem (2) were convex, then standard interior point methods
would be able to find an optimal allocation in polynomial
time. Unfortunately, this is not the case, as the following
counterexample illustrates.
Consider a system with two classes of customers and 2
queues i.e., M = N = 2. Class i customers arrive according
to a stationary Poisson process of rate λi while the job sizes for
both classes are i.i.d. exponential with unit mean. Both servers
have a unit service rate. We also assume that λ1+λ2 < 1 and
β1 > β2. The arrivals of class i are routed to queue j with
probability pij , independent of the routing of other customers.
Since pi1 = 1 − pi2, U(·) may be seen to be a function of
only (p11, p21) taking values in [0, 1]2. To simplify notation,
we will use p1 = p11 and p2 = p21. The total arrival rate into
the two queues is given by
γ1 = λ1p1 + λ2p2, γ2 = λ1(1− p1) + λ2(1− p2). (4)
Since the the arrivals are Poisson, the routing is a Bernoulli
sampling of the arrivals and the service time is exponential,
each of the two queues is an M/M/1 queue with Dj(γj) =
1/(1− γj). Therefore the social cost is
U(p1, p2) = (p1λ1β1 + p2λ2β2) (D1(γ1)−D2(γ2))
+ (λ1β1 + λ2β2)D2(γ2). (5)
We now have the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The social cost U(p1, p2) is not convex.
Proof: The partial derivative of the social cost U(p1, p2)
with respect to p1 is given by
∂U(p1, p2)
∂p1
= β1λ1
(
D1(γ1)−D2(γ2)
)
+ λ1D
′
1(γ1)(β1λ1p1 + β2λ2p2)
− λ1D
′
2(γ2)
(
β1λ1(1 − p1) + β2λ2(1 − p2)
)
.
(6)
Take p1 = p2 = 1/2. Then, γ1 = γ2. As the functions D1
and D2 are identical, being the delays at identical ·/M/1
queues, hence so are their derivatives, and it is easy to see that
∂U(p1, p2)/∂p1 = 0 at (1/2, 1/2). Similarly, ∂U(p1, p2)/∂p2
is also zero at this point, and it follows that the social cost
function has zero gradient at (1/2, 1/2). If U(·, ·) were a
convex function, it would follow that (1/2, 1/2) is a global
minimizer. We shall show that this is not the case, and hence
that U cannot be a convex function.
Define L1 = {(p1, p2) : γ1 = γ2}, which is a line segment
in [0, 1]2. Observe from (4) and (5) that γ1 + γ2 = λ1 + λ2,
6and that U(p1, p2) is a constant on L1, with value (λ1β1 +
λ2β2)D1
(
λ1+λ2
2
)
. Now, (1/2, 1/2) ∈ L1, so, if the global
minimum of U(p1, p2) is attained at (1/2, 1/2), then it is also
attained at every point on L1. Hence, the gradient of U , if it
exists, should be zero at every point on L1. We show that this
is not the case.
Since γ1 = γ2 = (λ1 + λ2)/2 on L1, and the functions D1
and D2 are identical, we see from (6) that
∂U(p1, p2)
∂p1
= λ1D
′
1
(λ1 + λ2
2
)
×(
(2p1 − 1)β1λ1 + (2p2 − 1)β2λ2
)
.
Now D′1 is strictly positive by assumption, so the only way
that the partial derivative could be zero on L1 is if (2p1 −
1)β1λ1 + (2p2 − 1)β2λ2 is identically zero on the set L1.
But L1 is specified as the set on which γ1 = γ2, which, by
(4) implies that (2p1 − 1)λ1 + (2p2− 1)λ2 is identically zero
on L1. Since β1 6= β2 by assumption, it is impossible for
(2p1− 1)β1λ1 +(2p2− 1)β2λ2 to also be identically zero on
L1. Thus, U cannot achieve the global minimum on all of L1.
By contradiction, this proves that U is not a convex function.
A. A continuum of customer classes
The preceding results for a finite number of customer classes
can be also be extended to the case when the delay sensitivities
(β) are from a continuum of values. We first reformulate the
social welfare maximization problem in this setting. Let K(·, ·)
denote a kernel on R+ × {1, 2, . . . , N}, where N is the total
number of queues. In other words, K(β, ·) is a probability
distribution on {1, 2, . . . , N} for each β ∈ R+, and K(·, i) is a
Borel-measurable function on R+ for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}.
We interpret K(β, i) as the probability that a customer with
delay sensitivity β is allocated to queue i. Thus, the class
of static routing policies in the continuous setting can be
identified with the set of kernels described above. Now, the
welfare optimization problem is
inf
K
U(K) = λ
N∑
j=1
∫ ∞
β=0
βK(β, j)Dj(γj)dF (β), (7)
where γj = λ
∫ ∞
β=0
K(β, j)dF (β).
We can characterize the optimal solution in a manner analo-
gous to the setting with finitely many customer classes.
Theorem 2: Let K∗ achieve the minimum in (7) and let γ∗j
denote the arrival rates corresponding to K∗. Suppose β1 >
β2 > 0, and suppose i and j are distinct queues such that∫ ∞
β1
K(β, i)dF (β) > 0 and
∫ β2
0
K(β, j)dF (β) > 0.
Then Di(γ∗i ) < Dj(γ∗j ).
In words, the theorem says that if queue i is used by
customers with β1 or higher and queue j is used by customers
of β2 or lower then at optimal load distribution, the cost in
queue i will be less than that in queue j.
Proof: See appendix.
Now define two kernels K1 and K2 to be equivalent if the
set {β : K1(β, ·) 6= K2(β, ·)} has F -measure zero. We now
have the following corollary which characterizes the structure
of any welfare maximizing allocation.
Corollary 2: Suppose K∗ solves the optimization problem
(7), and let γ∗j denote the resulting flow rate. Consider a re-
ordering of the queues such that D1(γ∗1 ) ≤ D2(γ∗2 ) ≤ . . . ≤
DN(γ
∗
N ). Then, there is an m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} and β1 > β2 >
. . . > βm = 0 such that K∗ is equivalent to the allocation K
given by K(β, ·) = δi for all β ∈ [βi−1, βi) and 1 < i ≤
m, and K(β, ·) = δ1 for β ∈ [β1,∞). Here δi denotes the
probability distribution that puts unit mass on i. 
Note that if m = k < N, then the servers with index greater
than k are not used for allocation in the kernel K.
IV. ADMISSION PRICES AND WARDROP EQUILIBRIA
We now consider the same queueing model, but generalized
to include admission prices c1 > c2 > . . . > cN at
queues 1, 2, . . . , N. Each customer seeks to join a queue that
minimizes the sum of the admission price, which is common
to all classes, and the expected delay cost, which is weighted
by a class-specific sensitivity. In Section II, we modeled the
resulting interaction as a game, and wrote down the conditions
for a routing matrix P to be a Wardrop equilibrium in (3).
We shall now show that a Wardrop equilibrium has the same
structure that we demonstrated for a social optimum in the
previous section.
Theorem 3: Consider two customer classes i1 < i2, so that
βi1 > βi2 , and two queues j1 < j2, so that cj1 > cj2 . There
is no Wardrop equilibrium PW in which class i1 uses queue
j2 while class i2 simultaneously uses queue j1, i.e., pWi1,j2 > 0
and pWi2,j1 > 0.
Proof: We shall continue to use the lighter notation of
the previous section.
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose such a Wardrop
equilibrium exists. Since pW12 > 0 and pW21 > 0, we have by
(3) that
c2 + β1D
W
2 ≤ c1 + β1D
W
1 , c1 + β2D
W
1 ≤ c2 + β2D
W
2 .
Re-arranging these inequalities, we get
β1(D
W
2 −D
W
1 ) ≤ c1 − c2 ≤ β2(D
W
2 −D
W
1 ). (8)
Since c1 > c2, the second inequality implies that DW2 −DW1 is
strictly positive. But β1 > β2, so the two inequalities together
imply that DW2 −DW1 ≤ 0. This is a contradiction, so such a
Wardrop equilibrium cannot exist.
We have the following corollary, which is an analogue of
Corollary 1. The proof is omitted as it is straightforward.
Corollary 3: Suppose PW is a Wardrop equilibrium. There
exist numbers n1, . . . , nM , with 1 ≤ n1 ≤ n2 ≤ . . . nM ≤ N,
such that
pWij = 0, if j /∈ {ni−1, . . . ni}.

The main difference from Corollary 1 is that we do not
guarantee that all routing probabilities are strictly positive in-
side these ranges. Whereas, in the welfare-optimizing setting,
any unused queues were necessarily those with the largest
7delays, now either a large delay or a high admission price
or a combination of the two could result in a queue not being
used by any customer class.
For a given set of admission prices, Corollary 3 character-
izes the structure of a Wardrop equilibrium PW . However,
we do not know if this is unique. Showing the uniqueness in
the general case and without additional assumptions appears
to be a hard problem. However, in [26], we show that for
the two-queue case, if β is from an absolutely continuous
distribution, the Wardrop equilibrium is indeed unique. We
also performed extensive numerical experiments on several
models under reasonable assumptions of the arrival rates,
service rates and cost functions and we did not find more
than one equilibrium in any of the cases that we tried.
Following exactly the same arguments as in Theorem 3
and Corollary 3, Corollary 4 follows for the case when the
delay costs of the customers are from an absolutely continuous
distribution F.
Corollary 4: Suppose KW satisfies the Wardrop equilib-
rium condition. There exist thresholds β1, β2, . . . , βN such
that β1 ≥ β2 ≥ . . . ≥ βN ∈ R+ and KW (β, ·) = δi for
all β ∈ (βi−1, βi) and 1 < i ≤ N while KW (β, ·) = δ1 for
β ∈ (β1,∞) with δi denoting the probability distribution that
puts unit mass on i. 
Since F is absolutely continuous, at each threshold βi for
i = 1 . . .N − 1, the following is satisfied
ci + βiDi(γi) = ci+1 + βiDi+1(γi+1) (9)
A natural mechanism design problem suggested by the
above results is whether we can set admission prices in
queues in such a way that selfish users reacting to these
prices would assign themselves to queues in the proportions
required for optimizing social welfare. Pigou [27] proposed
the use of a charge or levy to internalize the congestion
externality in transport networks, thereby guiding the system
to a social optimum. Such charges are known as Pigouvian
taxes and they have been studied in several contexts including
queueing systems [8], [9] and transportation networks [28],
[29]. However, these have typically focused on managing
demand or guiding route choice, whereas here we study their
use to achieve service differentiation in a multi-class setting.
Let P ∗ denote the routing matrix solving the social welfare
optimization problem and γ∗j the corresponding traffic flow
rate at queue j for j = 1, to N . Now, a marginal unit of
traffic at queue n increases the delay of each customer at this
queue by D′n(γ∗n). This imposes a cost of βmD′n(γ∗n) on each
class m customer using this queue, of whom there are λmp∗mn
per unit time. Thus, the total congestion externality caused by
a marginal unit of traffic at queue n, which is the Pigouvian
tax for this queue, is given by
cn =
M∑
m=1
βmλmp
∗
mnD
′
n(γ
∗
n). (10)
We shall show that, if the admission price at each queue is
set equal to the Pigouvian tax at that queue, then the optimal
allocation P ∗ is a Wardrop equilibrium.
Theorem 4: Let P ∗ be a routing matrix solving the social
welfare optimization problem. Assume that the resulting flows
at the servers are such that γ∗n is in the interior of the
domain of Dn(·) for each queue, n. Let the admission prices
c1, c2, . . . , cN at queues 1, 2, . . . , N be set according to (10).
Then P ∗ is a Wardrop equilibrium of the resulting game.
Proof: Since P ∗ solves the constrained optimization
problem in (2), the constraints on P are affine, and U is con-
tinuously differentiable at P ∗, it follows that P ∗ must satisfy
the KKT conditions: these state that there exist A ∈ RM×N
and b ∈ RM such that
∂U(P )
∂pin
∣∣∣∣
P=P∗
= ain + bi, ain ≥ 0, ain = 0 if p∗in > 0.
(11)
Here, ain is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint pin ≥ 0,
and is zero if the constraint is slack, and bi is the Lagrange
multiplier on the constraint
∑N
m=1 pim = 1.
If class i uses queue n in the optimal allocation P ∗, then
(11) implies that, for all m = 1, . . . , N , we have
∂U(P )
∂pin
∣∣∣∣
P=P∗
≤
∂U(P )
∂pim
∣∣∣∣
P=P∗
.
Differentiating U(P ) defined in (2), we can rewrite this as
βiλiDn(γ
∗
n) +
M∑
j=1
βjλjp
∗
jnD
′(γ∗n)λi
≤ βiλiDm(γ
∗
m) +
M∑
j=1
βjλjp
∗
jmD
′(γ∗m)λi.
Substituting (10) in the above, we get
βiDn(γ
∗
n) + cn ≤ βiDm(γ
∗
m) + cm,
for all m = 1, . . . , N . This holds for every i and n such that
class i uses queue n. Comparing this with (3), we see that this
is exactly the condition for P ∗ to be a Wardrop equilibrium.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
When the β of the arriving customer is a i.i.d. random from
an absolutely continuous distribution, then the Pigouvian price
at queue n is
cn =
∫ ∞
0
βK∗(β, n)D′n(γ
∗
n)λdF (β) (12)
Setting this as the admission price to the queues and
arguing as above we show below that the optimum K∗(·, ·)
corresponds to a Wardrop equilibrium.
Theorem 5: Let K∗ be a kernel solving the social welfare
optimization problem. Let the admission prices c1, c2, . . . , cN
at queues 1, 2, . . . , N be set according to (12). Then K∗ is a
Wardrop equilibrium of the resulting game.
Proof: See Appendix.
V. EXAMPLES
A. A Two-Class, Two-Queue System
We begin this section by first considering a system with two
customer classes and two exponential servers of rates µ1 and
µ2.
To simplify notation, let p1 := p11 = 1 − p12 and p2 :=
p21 = 1 − p22. The two queues essentially become M/M/1
8queues with arrival rates γ1 = p1λ1 + p2λ2 and γ2 = (1 −
p1)λ1 + (1− p2)λ2. Let βi be the delay cost of class i. First
consider the social optimization of minimizing the weighted
delay cost. It can be shown that only one of the following is
true.
1) p∗1 = 1 and 1 ≥ p∗2 ≥ 0.
2) 1 > p∗1 ≥ 0 and p∗2 = 0.
This is a special case of Corollary 1. In fact we can also show
that there are at most four candidate (p∗1, p∗2). This allows us
to determine the P ∗ exactly.
Now let c1 = c and c2 = 0 be the admission prices to the
two queues and let the customers choose the queue selfishly.
Let pWi be the equilibrium routing probabilities. For this case
we can show that only one of the following is true.
1) pW1 = 1 and 1 ≥ pW2 ≥ 0.
2) 1 > pW1 ≥ 0 and pW2 = 0.
Observe that this is a special case of Corollary 3. Some of
the preceding results are available in [30], [31] and have been
included here for sake of completeness.
From the preceding, using Theorem 4, we can determine c∗1
and c∗2 that will yield a PW satisfying PW = P ∗.
B. A Numerical Example
An analytical treatment of anything more general than the
two-class two-server system would be too complex to gain any
insights. To gain more insight, we now provide a numerical
example for a slightly larger system.
Consider a system serving five customer classes with five
servers i.e., M = N = 5 with mean delay as the cost function.
Customers of class i arrive according to a stationary unit rate
Poisson process and have βi = (6 − i). All classes have
exponentially distributed job sizes with unit mean. Server j
has service rate µj with µ1 = 2, µ2 = 3, µ3 = 2.5 µ4 = 1.1
and µ5 = 1.5. Thus the five queues are all M/M/1 and the
mean delay at queue j is Dj(γj) = 1µj−γj . P
∗ that minimizes
U(P ) is obtained numerically and is as follows.
P ∗ =


Q2 Q3 Q1 Q5 Q4
Cl 1 1 0 0 0 0
Cl 2 0.528 0.472 0 0 0
Cl 3 0 0.788 0.212 0 0
Cl 4 0 0 0.786 0.214 0
Cl 5 0 0 0 0.517 0.483


This corresponds to γ1 = 0.998, γ2 = 1.528, γ3 = 1.26,
γ4 = 0.483, and γ5 = 0.731 and D1 = 0.998, D2 = 0.679,
D3 = 0.806, D4 = 1.62, and D5 = 1.3. Observe that in
P ∗ the servers are reordered in increasing order of the mean
delays with Qi denoting the server with service rate µi. We
also see that this P ∗ satisfies Corollary 1. With the above
allocation we see that U(P ∗) = 12.47.
Next, let the admission prices for queues 1, . . . , 5 be, re-
spectively, 2.57, 1.53, 0.7, 0.42, and 0. A Wardrop equilibrium
allocation at these prices will be
PW =


Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Cl 1 0.4 0.6 0 0 0
Cl 2 0 1 0 0 0
Cl 3 0 0.2 0.8 0 0
Cl 4 0 0 0.8 0.2 0
Cl 5 0 0 0 0.1 0.9

.
Clearly, PW satisfies Corollary 3. The Pigouvian admission
prices are 3.28, 2.77, 2.194, 1.59, and 1.27. It can be verified
that for these prices, the Wardrop equilibrium condition is
satisfied by the social welfare maximizing allocation, P ∗.
Next we consider an alternative cost function with Dn(γn)
denoting the probability that the waiting time experienced by
an arriving customer in queue n is more than a fixed amount
T. Since the queues are M/M/1, We now have
Dn(γn) = ρn exp((γn − µn)T )
where ρn = γn/µn. For T = 1 and the other parameters as in
the preceding example, the optimal routing probabilities will
be
P ∗ =


Q2 Q3 Q1 Q5 Q4
Cl 1 1 0 0 0 0
Cl 2 0.42 0.58 0 0 0
Cl 3 0 0.61 0.39 0 0
Cl 4 0 0 0.59 0.41 0
Cl 5 0 0 0 0.37 0.63

.
Further, the Pigouvian prices such that PW = P ∗ for this case
are 1.5789, 0.9809, 0.5555, 0.2813, and 0.1489.
We remark here that the price vector that induces a PW
that is the same as P ∗ is not unique. For example, changing
the Pigouvian prices of all the queues by a fixed amount will
also have a PW that is the same as P ∗.
C. M/G/1− LIFO and M/G/1− PS queues
Recall that in all the preceding analyses, we have assumed
that customers of all classes have the same job size distri-
butions, and that, once they join a queue, they are treated
identically within it. We now describe some systems where we
can relax this assumption and allow different classes to have
a different job size distributions. Throughout this example,
let Si denote the mean job size of a Class i customer with
the assumption that S1 ≥ S2 ≥ . . . ≥ SN .We assume that
the service discipline at the servers is either processor-sharing
(PS) or last-come-first-serve with preemption (LCFS-PR) and
the service rate of each server is unity. Now define βˆi := βiSi
and note that βˆ1 > βˆ2 > . . . > βˆN . The mean sojourn time
of a Class i customer at server j is now given by
Dij(ρj) = SiDj(ρj) (13)
where
Dj(ρj) =
1
1− ρj
(14)
9and ρj =
∑M
i=1 pijλiSi. The social welfare objective now is
U(P ) =
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
βˆiλipijDj(ρj). (15)
Note that replacing λi in (2) by λiSi gives (15) and the
analysis for the structural properties of P ∗ and PW remains
unaffected. The theorems and corollaries discussed in the
preceding sections should be suitably modified with βˆi now
assuming the role of βi.
D. Fair Allocation
Recall that the cost function for each class is rather general
and only requires that it be increasing in the server load. This
means that the objective function for social optimality could be
used to achieve other objectives. As an example, we consider
fair routing. We illustrate this for the case of discrete classes.
For routing matrix P, let Ui(P ) = βi
∑N
j=1 pijDj(γj) be the
expected cost for a Classs i customer. Let ψ(·) be a convex
increasing function and let
U(P ) =
M∑
i=1
λi
λ
ψ(Ui(P )) (16)
be the social cost function instead of (2). Convexity of ψ
implies that larger Ui are penalised more heavily and hence
allocation will tend to equalise Ui for each class. Specifically,
from Jensen’s inequality and the observation that
∑M
i=1 λi =
λ, we have
M∑
i=1
λi
λ
ψ(Ui(P )) ≥
M∑
i=1
λi
λ
ψ

 M∑
j=1
λj
λ
(Uj(P ))

 .
The right hand side above can be interpreted as the social
utility with routing matrix P ′ such that
Ui(P
′) =
M∑
j=1
λj
λ
(Uj(P )).
P ′ corresponds to a fairer allocation than P in the sense that
the delay costs of each of the classes are more equal with
P ′ than with P. Thus minimizing U defined in (16) would
make the allocations more equal and would achieve fairness.
Admittedly, this is a significantly simplified example for a
specific interpretation of fairness to illustrate the generality of
our model and a more detailed analysis may be carried out.
VI. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
We considered a very general model of multiple parallel
queues serving a heterogeneous customer population, and
studied the problem of routing customers to queues so as to
maximize social welfare. We characterized certain structural
properties of the welfare-optimizing allocation. Next, we con-
sidered selfish routing decisions made by individual customers
and characterized the structure of Wardrop equilibria. We then
showed that, if queues charge admission prices, and these
are set equal to the congestion externalities at the optimal
allocation, then the social optimum coincides with a Wardrop
equilibrium.
Our results raise a number of questions for future research.
Firstly, as mentioned in Section III, the computational com-
plexity of determining the optimal allocation is unknown; we
only showed that the optimization problem is non-convex.
Likewise, the computational complexity of determining the
Wardrop equilibria is also unknown.
A second question concerns the informational constraints
on the model. We have assumed that the parameters λi and βi
are known, and available as input to determining the socially
optimal allocation or setting admission prices. In practice,
this information is unlikely to be available, but needs to be
inferred from observation. If customer classes are known upon
arrival, then the arrival rates λ can easily be measured, but
eliciting β truthfully can still be a challenge. The problem
is much harder if customers are heterogeneous but there are
either no clearly defined classes, or that class membership
is unobservable, as is often likely to be the case. In such a
situation, is it still possible to set admission prices in such a
way as to ensure that the Wardrop equilibrium either coincides
with the welfare optimizing allocation, or approximates it to
within some factor?
Finally, we have assumed that a benevolent mechanism
designer sets admission prices to maximize social welfare; it
is interesting to ask what happens if the admission prices are
set by a revenue maximizing service provider. Further, in such
a revenue maximizing scenario it would be interesting to see if
competing service providers can sustain differentiated services.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 2
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1 so we only sketch
it briefly.
The proof is again by contradiction. Suppose first that D∗i >
D∗j . We can modify K∗ so as to swap a small but non-zero
volume of traffic with delay sensitivity β ≤ β2 in queue j
with an equal volume of traffic with delay sensitivity β ≥ β1
in queue i. As the traffic intensities at the two queues are left
unchanged by this swap, so are the delays D∗i and D∗j . But the
cost corresponding to these delays has strictly decreased for
the swapped traffic (as traffic with higher delay sensitivity β ≥
β1 > β2 has been moved to the queue with lower delay, and
replaced with an equal quantity of less delay sensitive traffic),
while remaining unchanged for all other traffic. Consequently,
the total cost U(·) of the routing has been decreased. This
contradicts the optimality of K∗.
Suppose next that D∗i = D∗j . Consider the swap described
above, and let K1 denote the kernel corresponding to the re-
sulting routing. For α ∈ [0, 1], define Kα = (1−α)K∗+αK1.
The volumes of traffic, γα, at any queue are exactly the same
for every Kα, and hence so are the delays at each queue.
Consequently, the total cost U(Kα) does not depend on α.
Consequently, every Kα must be optimal.
Now consider modifying Kα by moving an ǫ quantity of
traffic from queue i to queue j. Such a change causes the total
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cost to increase by the quantity
∆U = ǫ
(
D′j(γ
∗
j )
∫ ∞
0
βKα(β, j)dF (β) −
D′i(γ
∗
i )
∫ ∞
0
βKα(β, i)dF (β)
)
+ o(ǫ).
Note in particular that, to first order, the change in cost does
not depend on the composition of the traffic moved between
the queues, but depends only on the externalities imposed by
the move on the rest of the traffic in the queues. Now, the opti-
mality of Kα requires that ∆U = o(ǫ), i.e., that the expression
in brackets be zero. But it is impossible that this can hold
simultaneously for all α ∈ [0, 1] since
∫∞
0
βKα(β, j)dF (β)
increases with α while
∫∞
0 βK
α(β, i)dF (β) decreases with
α.
B. Theorem 5
Since K∗ solves the optimization problem in (7), modifying
K∗ by moving a non zero volume of traffic from queue i to
queue j must not cause the total cost to decrease. Let βj , for
j = 1, . . . , βm be as in Corollary 2. Specifically, consider β1
and ǫ such that βj−1 < β1 < β1 + ǫ < βj . Modify K∗ to K∗ǫ
by reallocating customers with delay cost β ∈ [β1, β1 + ǫ] to
server i. This increases the arrival rate to server i by
h(ǫ) :=
∫ β1+ǫ
β1
λdF (β).
The change in the social utility due to this reallocation is
∆U = Di(γi + h(ǫ))
∫ ∞
0
λβK∗ǫ (β, j)dF (β)
+ Dj(γj − h(ǫ))
∫ ∞
0
λβK∗ǫ (β, j)dF (β)
− Di(γi)
∫ ∞
0
λβK∗(β, i)dF (β)
− Dj(γj)
∫ ∞
0
λβK∗(β, j)dF (β)
= h(ǫ)
(Dj(γj − h(ǫ))−Dj(γj))
h(ǫ)
∫ ∞
0
λβK∗(β, j)dF (β)
− Dj(γj − h(ǫ))
∫ β1+ǫ
β1
λβdF (β)
+ h(ǫ)
(Di(γi + h(ǫ))−Di(γi))
h(ǫ)
∫ ∞
0
λβK∗(β, i)dF (β)
+ Di(γi + h(ǫ))
∫ β1+ǫ
β1
λβdF (β).
As ǫ→ 0,
h(ǫ) → 0
h(ǫ)
ǫ
→ λf(β1)
1
ǫ
∫ β1+ǫ
β1
βdF (β) → β1f(β1).
Dividing throughout by ǫ and taking limits as ǫ → 0, the
limiting value of ∆U is
λ2f(β1)D′i(γ
∗
i )
∫ ∞
0
βK∗(β, i)dF (β) + λDi(γi)β
1f(β1)
−λ2f(β1)D′j(γ
∗
j )
∫ ∞
0
βK∗(β, j)dF (β) − λDj(γj)β
1f(β1).
Optimality of K∗ requires that this be non negative. Hence
dividing throughout by λf(β1) and using (12), we have
β1Dj(γj) + cj ≤ β
1Di(γi) + ci.
The choice of β1 in the interval (βj−1, βj) was arbitrary.
Further, the choice of i was also arbitrary. Hence for all
β ∈ (βj−1, βj), we have
βDj(γj) + cj ≤ βDi(γi) + ci.
for all i = 1, . . . , N. This is the Wardrop condition and hence
completes the proof.
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